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Abstract
Background: Withdrawal of conditional regulatory approval or subsidization of new medicines when subsequent
evidence does not confirm early trial results may not be well understood or accepted by the public.
Objectives: We present a case study of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s decision to withdraw the
indication of bevacizumab for the treatment of advanced breast cancer and include an analysis of the reactions of
stakeholders with a view to identifying opportunities for improving risk management for new medicines with
conditional approval or funding.
Methods: We drew on a range of information sources, including FDA documents, medical journals and media
reports, to describe the evidentiary basis of the FDA decisions. We analysed the reactions and perspectives of the
stakeholders.
Results: In 2008 bevacizumab was granted conditional approval for treatment of advanced breast cancer by the
FDA pending submission of supplementary satisfactory evidence. In 2011 the FDA decision to withdraw the
indication was met with a hostile reaction from many clinicians and cancer survivors. There were different
interpretations of the therapeutic value of bevacizumab with strong beliefs among cancer survivors that the
medicine was effective and potential harm was manageable. High expectations of the public may have been
encouraged by overly positive media reports and limited understanding by the public of the complexity of the
scientific evaluation of new medicines and of the regulatory processes.
Conclusions: Improving understanding and acceptance of approval or coverage schemes conditional to evidence
development may require the development of risk management plans by regulatory and funding institutions. They
may include a range of strategies such as requirements for formal patient acknowledgment of the conditional
availability of the medicine, ‘black-triangle’ equivalent labels that identify full approval is based on pending
evidence, and ongoing communication with the media, public and health professionals.
Keywords: Pharmaceutical policy, Managed entry agreement, Medicine subsidization, Coverage with evidence
development
Introduction
In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has implemented an accelerated approval pro-
gram for medicines that appear to provide a benefit for
serious or life-threatening illnesses lacking satisfactory
treatments [1]. Under this program, medicines are given
a conditional approval based on clinical trial data that
suggest efficacy but are not sufficient to permit full
approval. Full approval depends on subsequent con-
firmatory clinical trials. Some countries with national
public health insurance systems, including Australia,
Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom, have introduced
similar ‘coverage-with-evidence development’ schemes in
which approved medicines may be subsidised pending
the later submission of satisfactory research data [2].
These new schemes are attractive for policymakers
as they may temporarily resolve tensions between the
objectives of (a) maintaining efficacy, safety and cost-
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effectiveness standards when granting approval or
coverage of new medicines and (b) meeting public and
industry’s expectations for access. However, with-
drawal of conditional approval or funding of medi-
cines when the additional research does not confirm
early favourable results may not be well understood or
accepted by patients and health professionals, and
regulatory and funding agencies need to prepare for
this possibility.
There have been, as yet, few examples of withdrawals of
medicines for reasons of uncertain efficacy after condi-
tional approval. In 2011 the FDA announced its decision
to withdraw the marketing approval of bevacizumab
(Avastin®) for the treatment of advanced breast cancer.
Bevacizumab had been approved for this indication under
the FDA accelerated approval program in 2008. In this
paper, we consider this case study as the first example of
an indication being withdrawn due to uncertain efficacy in
a highly sensitive political context, the therapeutic man-
agement of advanced breast cancer. The withdrawal was
highly contested, and this is a case from which other
countries with schemes for regulatory approval or cover-
age conditional on evidence development could usefully
learn. We analysed both the basis of the FDA’s decisions
and stakeholders’ reactions to them with a view to inform-
ing the development of risk management plans condi-
tional approval or funding schemes.
Methods
A documentary analysis was undertaken based on a range
of documentary sources relating to bevacizumab published
between 2005 and 2012. From the FDA website documents
were retrieved related to the Oncologic Drug Advisory
Committee (ODAC) meetings, transcripts and public sub-
missions to the FDA, and the final 69-page document by
Margaret Hamburg, the FDA commissioner explaining the
reasons for bevacizumab withdrawal. Medical journal arti-
cles were identified through a literature search on the Web
of Knowledge website. Media reports were obtained from
Drug Information Daily newsfeed and Factiva news media
database using ‘bevacizumab’ or ‘Avastin’ as search terms.
An analytical framework was developed with a focus
on three main themes for data analysis: (1) rationale of
FDA’s decisions for granting and revoking approval of
bevacizumab for the treatment of advanced breast cancer;
(2) stakeholders’ involvement and reactions to the deci-
sions; and (3) implications for future risk management
strategies. Specifically, government documents and medical
journal articles were used to retrace the regulatory ap-
proval history of bevacizumab. A descriptive analysis of the
evidentiary basis of the FDA decisions was conducted con-
sidering the types of scientific uncertainties that generated
conflicting interpretations. Media reports, medical journal
articles and government documents were utilised to
examine the reactions of key stakeholders, including pa-
tients, consumer organisations, the pharmaceutical indus-
try, health professionals and the media, to the FDA
withdrawal process. These three sources of information
provided complementary insights on the debates, both
within the medical community and among the public at
large, which took place over that period. Insights from the
first two themes informed discussion of strategies that
could be used to improve the public understanding and
acceptability of schemes for regulatory approval or cover-
age conditional on evidence development.
Results
Background and history of events
Bevacizumab is a recombinant humanised monoclonal
antibody to vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF)
marketed by Genentech as Avastin®. Bevacizumab inhibits
the binding of VEGF to its receptors on the surface of
endothelial cells, thereby reducing the vascularisation of
cancerous tumours and inhibiting their growth.
In 2004, bevacizumab was first approved by the FDA as
treatment for metastatic colorectal cancer. It then gained
approval for other indications including non-small cell
lung cancer, renal cell carcinoma, and glioblastoma [3]. In
February 2008, bevacizumab was approved for first-line
treatment of metastatic breast cancer under the FDA’s
accelerated approval program (Table 1). The approval was
based on the results from a single study, the E2100 trial,
published in the New England Journal of Medicine
(NEJM) journal in 2007 [4]. This trial showed an increase
in median progression-free survival in women with ad-
vanced breast cancer treated with bevacizumab in com-
bination with paclitaxel but no increase in overall survival
compared to those treated with paclitaxel alone [4]
(Table 2). Reprints of the NEJM article were actively used
by Genentech, the makers of bevacizumab, to promote
the drug to physicians [5] and Genentech estimated that
about 9000 breast cancer patients in the United States had
been treated with ‘off-label’ bevacizumab (i.e. outside
marketing authorisation) at the time of the FDA’s approval
in 2008 [6].
The official review of bevacizumab for metastatic breast
cancer by ODAC was less positive than the NEJM paper.
It highlighted several methodological shortcomings of the
E2100 trial, including the use of progression-free survival
as an endpoint and the lack of blinding [7]. Progression-
free survival has not been shown convincingly to be an
appropriate surrogate endpoint for breast cancer or to be
predictive of overall survival [8]. The lack of blinding
meant that knowledge of which drug(s) individual patients
were receiving could have influenced judgements of their
responses to treatment. An independent, blinded review
of radiological and clinical data of all patients in the E2100
trial was therefore required by the FDA. Although this
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confirmed that the addition of bevacizumab to paclitaxel
resulted in a statistically significant improvement in
progression-free survival (hazard ratio 0.48, 95 % CI 0.39
to 0.61; P < 0.0001) [9], the estimate of the magnitude of
the effect lacked reliability because of incomplete data
(10 % of patients), loss to follow-up (34 % patients) and
lack of consistency in determination of radiologic disease
progression [7]. ODAC also highlighted important safety
issues with bevacizumab including a 20.2 % increase in
grade 3–5 toxicity (including hypertension, sensory neur-
opathy, thromboembolism, gastrointestinal perforation,
haemorrhage) and 1.7 % incidence of treatment-related
death in the bevacizumab plus paclitaxel arm compared to
0 % the paclitaxel arm [7, 10].
Based on all this evidence, ODAC, which comprised
seven experts in the field of oncology or statistics,
and two consumer representatives, voted five to four
in an open voting process not to recommend ap-
proval on the question of whether the data provided
were ‘sufficient to establish a favourable risk/benefit
analysis for the use of bevacizumab plus paclitaxel for
first-line treatment of patients with metastatic breast
cancer” [11].
Despite the ODAC vote, the FDA granted approval con-
tingent on the results of additional studies in February
2008. This decision generated great interest for both
financial and health reasons. It markedly benefited the
drug maker’s potential market and sales revenue, and
Genentech’s stock rose by more than 8 % in after-hours
trading [12]. The FDA decision was also perceived as
clinically controversial. Some health professionals and a
patient advocacy group, the National Breast Cancer Coali-
tion Fund, expressed concern about a lowering of the
FDA standards for medicine approval [12]. Other experts
welcomed the decision because they believed that it was ‘a
matter of time before a survival benefit is documented’ [6].
Almost two and a half years later, in July 2010, the
ODAC convened to re-evaluate the approval and exam-
ined the results of two additional clinical trials [13, 14]
(Table 2) and voted 12 to one to recommend removing
the indication of bevacizumab for metastatic breast can-
cer [15]. The two new studies did not demonstrate a differ-
ence in overall survival and showed smaller improvement
in progression-free survival than in the original E2100 trial.
None of the studies demonstrated an improvement in qual-
ity of life and all showed an increased risk of serious
adverse effects including gastrointestinal perforation and
severe bleeding (Table 3). The overall proportion of
treatment-related deaths was similar (1.8 %) in both
bevacizumab and control groups [16].
In December 2010, the FDA announced it would start
withdrawing the indication. Around 17,000 women with
advanced breast cancer were being treated with bevacizu-
mab at that time, and financial analysts estimated that a
withdrawal of FDA approval for breast cancer could cost
Genentech nearly $1 billion in sales based on previously
projected figures [17]. Genentech filed an opposition peti-
tion requesting an administrative hearing.
In June 2011, there was a two-day hearing which involved
ODAC experts, experts nominated by Genentech and per-
mitted members of the public to provide oral testimony.
Electronic or written comments on the FDA’s proposal to
withdraw approval were also invited [18].
Around 450 public submissions were sent to the FDA
during the hearing period, mostly by consumers asking the
FDA to maintain the indication as their perception was the
drug had benefited themselves or close friends and family
[19]. In the first part of the hearing, 35 members of the
public provided their views. They included survivors of
advanced breast cancer and representatives from consumer
organisations including ‘Facing Our Risk of Cancer
Empowered’(FORCE, representing people living with a
Table 1 History of regulatory events
Date FDA decisions
26 February 2004 FDA approval of bevacizumab as first-line treatment for metastatic colorectal cancer in combination with intravenous 5-
fluorouracil
20 June 2006 FDA approval of bevacizumab as second-line treatment for metastatic colorectal cancer
5 December 2007 ODAC voted 5 to 4 against the recommendation bevacizumab for treatment of metastatic breast cancer in combination with
paclitaxel
22 February 2008 FDA granted accelerated approval of bevacizumab in combination with paclitaxel for the treatment of metastatic breast cancer
20 July 2010 ODAC voted 12 to 1 revoking approval of bevacizumab for the treatment of metastatic HER2 negative breast cancer
16 December
2010
FDA initiated the withdrawal process
16 January 2011 Genentech requested an hearing
28–29 June 2011 FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee hearing recommended the indication withdrawal
18 November
2011
FDA withdrew officially the indication
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Table 2 Efficacy results of bevacizumab trials [28]
Trial Line in
therapy
Trial years Number
patients
enrolled
Comparison Progression-free survival Overall survival
Median difference
(months)
Hazard Ratio (95 % confidence
interval, P value)
Median
difference
(months)
Hazard Ratio
(95 % confidence interval,
P value)
AVF2119g trial [63] Second line
(previously
treated with
anthracycline
and taxane)
2000–2002 462 Bevacizumab plus capecitabine
versus capecitabine
0.7 0.98 (0.77–1.25, P < 0.86) 0.6 1.05 (0.86–1.30, P < 0.63)
E2100 trial [4, 10] First line 2001–2004 722 Bevacizumab plus paclitaxel versus
paclitaxel
5.5 0.48 (0.39–0.61, P < 0.0001) 1.7 0.87 (0.72–1.05, P = 0.137)
AVADO trial
(BO17708) [13, 28]
First line 2006–2007 736 Bevacizumab plus docetaxel versus
docetaxel
0.9 0.62 (0.48–0.79, P = 0.0003) - 1.7 1.00, 0.76–1.32, P = 0.98)
RIBBON-1 (AVF3694g)
[14, 28]
First line 2005–2007 622 Bevacizumab plus taxane/anthracycline
versus taxane/anthracycline
1.2 0.64 (0.52–0.80, P < 0.0001) Not
reported
1.11 (0.86–1.43, P = 0.44)
2005–2007 615 Bevacizumab plus capecitabine versus
capecitabine
2.9 0.69 (0.56–0.84, P =0.0002) 2.9 0.88 (0.69–1.13, P = 0.33)
RIBBON-2
(AVF3693g) [28]
Second line 2006–2008 684 Bevacizumab plus taxanes, capecitabine
or gemcitabine versus taxanes,
capecitabine or gemcitabine
2.1 0.78 (0.64–0.93, P = 0.0072) Non
significant
difference
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genetic mutation or hereditary cancer risk), the Abigail Al-
liance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, the
Ovarian Cancer National Alliance, breastcancer.org, Marti
Nelson Cancer Foundation, Colon Cancer Alliance, Kidney
Cancer Association, Cancer Support Community. Most
consumer groups urged the FDA to keep bevacizumab
available [20]. Survivors ascribed their survival and current
quality of life to bevacizumab and called themselves
‘super-responders’. There was no comment from the public
on the possibility of predicting in advance how responders
might be distinguished from non-responders or whether
responders may constitute a minority of women. This
question was acknowledged as unresolved during the
following scientific discussions of ODAC as no discrimin-
atory biological or genetic marker for predicting the effi-
cacy of bevacizumab had been identified in the clinical
trials.
Concerns on the safety of bevacizumab were rarely
raised by members of the public during the hearing, and
when they were it was usually to say that the adverse
effects of bevacizumab were mild or manageable. Only
one woman from SHARE leaders, a group of cancer sur-
vivors, said that ‘for every woman here testifying, there
are other women who we know – a member of our group
who bled out of every orifice of her body…another
woman…who had a brain haemorrhage. So those people
don’t come to testify’. Among the few consumer voices
that supported bevacizumab withdrawal was that of
Christine Brunswick, the vice president of the National
Breast Cancer Coalition and breast cancer survivor who
stated that ‘This decision can't be driven by anecdotes. It
must be driven by science’. At the end of the hearing,
ODAC voted 6–0 in favour of removing the indication
and the FDA finally withdrew its approval in November
2011, three and a half years after the initial conditional
approval.
The FDA withdrawal process prompted reactions from
patients, consumer organisations, health professionals,
healthcare policy makers and the pharmaceutical indus-
try, and the decision generated major media coverage in
newspapers and on television. Some patients were very
upset when the vote was announced with one woman
accusing the FDA committee of ‘killing 17,000 women
with one vote’ [21]. But criticism was not based solely on
patients’ beliefs in bevacizumab’s benefits. Freedom of
Access to Medicines, a project from The Abigail Alliance
that lobbies for wider access to developmental cancer
drugs, questioned the right of the FDA ‘to make a deci-
sion that should be left to a woman and her doctor’ [22].
The FDA was also accused of taking cost into consider-
ation [22].
Some consumer organisations feared that insurers
would not pay for the cost of bevacizumab after the
approval withdrawal. Susan G. Komen from the Cure,
the US largest breast cancer organization, declared that
“as a patient advocacy organization, we want to ensure
that women who are successfully using Avastin today
continue to have access to the drug, and that their treat-
ment be covered by third-party payers” [23]. Medicines
without FDA regulatory approval may still be prescribed
and used by patients ‘off-label’, i.e. for indications outside
the marketing authorizations, however, the extent to
which public or private health insurers may cover off-
label use may vary substantially [24]. Insurers initially
appeared to respond to these consumer concerns. The
day after the FDA hearing, the Centers for Medicare and
Table 3 Pooled safety results of bevacizumab trials for first-line treatment of advanced breast cancer (E2100, AVADO, RIBBON-1 y
Severe or life-threatening or fatal adverse events Pooled chemotherapy (n = 982) Pooled bevacizumab plus chemotherapy (n = 1679
% %
Any 23 37
Sensory neuropathy 7.1 10
Hypertension 1.2 9
Febrile neutropenia 3.5 6.5
Venous thromboembolic event 3.8 2.8
Proteinuria 0 2.3
Arterial thromboembolic event 0.3 1.6
Left ventricular systolic dysfunction 1.2 1.5
Hemorrhage 0.4 1.5
Abnormal tissue repair 0.8 1.7
Wound dehiscence 0.3 0.8
Fistula 0.3 0.5
Gastrointestinal perforation 0.5
Reversible posterior leukoencephalopathy syndrome 0 <0.1
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Medicaid Services (CMS), which determines how prod-
ucts are reimbursed under Medicare, the largest public
health insurance in the US, announced that they would
‘continue to cover the drug for breast cancer as long as
doctors are prescribing it’ [25]. The guideline committee
of the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCNN),
a consortium of 21 cancer centers, whose guidelines are
one of the main compendia used by American health
insurers to inform their coverage decisions [26], voted 24
to 0 with one abstention to continue recommending beva-
cizumab in combination with paclitaxel as an appropriate
treatment option for metastatic breast cancer for the
reason that it ‘improves time to progression and response
rates but does not improve overall survival’ [27]. It was
noted that nine of the 27 members of the Breast Cancer
Panel in charge of the NCNN guidelines on management
of breast cancer received financial support from Genen-
tech, the company manufacturing bevacizumab [28]. The
extent to which this had an impact, if any, on the reluc-
tance of the NCCN to change their guidelines in response
to the FDA withdrawal of the indication is unknown.
Three months later, however, Blue Shield of California
became the first large insurance company to announce it
would end payments for bevacizumab in the management
of advanced breast cancer [29].
Health professional and medical organisation responses
The FDA withdrawal process was heavily debated in med-
ical journals. An editorial in the Journal of Clinical Oncol-
ogy supported the FDA’s decision, stating that “the
outcomes were arguably not clinically compelling” [30].
Ralph D’Agostino, a professor of mathematics who served
on ODAC at the time of FDA’s initial approval of bevaci-
zumab, argued in the New England Journal of Medicine
that progression-free survival was not an acceptable pri-
mary endpoint for approval of first-line therapies in cancer
and ‘if its use becomes standard for accelerated or even
final approval, it will be more difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain solid data on overall survival’ [31]. An oncologist
who served as an ODAC member at the FDA hearing that
considered the withdrawal decision declared ‘we did not
want people to be hurt by a drug that does not work that
well. We do not want to provide false hope’ [32]. In con-
trast, Dr Milton Wolf, a radiologist, wrote an article for
the conservative Washington Times entitled ‘The FDA’s
one-man death panel’ and claimed that the ‘FDA denies
Americans access to life-saving drugs.’ He described the
cost and complexity of the FDA’s processes as ‘regulatory
barriers’ that impede the access to innovative medicines in
the US.
The opinions of health professionals on the FDA with-
drawal decision were examined in an study conducted after
ODAC’s recommendation to revoke approval of bevacizu-
mab between September and December 2010 [33]. This
email survey included 564 participants from across the
world, mostly medical oncologists. About 50 % of the
respondents said that, if the DFA cancelled approval, they
would use bevacizumab in an off-label indication, mainly in
patients with triple-receptor negative breast cancer. A small
majority (52 %) agreed with the FDA decision to withdraw
the indication on the ground that the benefits shown in the
two additional studies with bevacizumab were not of the
same amount observed in the initial E2100 trial but 48 %
believed this was not a valid reason. Another study exam-
ined trends in use of bevacizumab for breast cancer in 122
oncology practices involving 570 oncologists in the US [34].
It found that the use declined by 37 % between May 2010
(just prior to the ODAC meeting revoking approval) and
November 2010 (just prior to the start of the FDA with-
drawal process) and by 63 % just prior to the FDA official
withdrawal notice without concomitant changes to clinical
guidelines or insurers’ coverage policies that may explain
these trends.
Media coverage
A study of 359 articles published in North American news-
papers about bevacizumab and breast cancer before, during
and after the FDA approval period showed that, prior to
the FDA approval, the reports tended to present bevacizu-
mab positively: 82 % of articles noted efficacy and only 23
and 24 % reported the lack of efficacy or side effects
respectively [35]. The proportions of positive headline tone
(36 % before approval, 18 % during approval, 9 % after
approval, p = 0.0002) and positive article tone (42 %, 19 %,
15 %, p < 0.0001) declined with each study period. Industry
representatives were more likely to be quoted prior to the
approval than at later times (33 %, 23 %, 11 %, p = 0.014).
Discussion
There is a number of international examples where the
potential withdrawal of medicines which had been made
available pending confirmatory scientific evidence was
strongly opposed by pharmaceutical companies or con-
sumers. The negative scientific findings of a costly patient
access scheme for medicines for multiple sclerosis in the
United Kingdom did not trigger any price reduction nor
withdrawal of the medicines and this failure was at least
partly attributed to unclear governance processes [36]. Still
in the United Kingdom, the recent decision to withdraw 16
medicines covering 25 cancer indications from the Cancer
Drug Fund, a scheme which gave cancer patients access to
cancer medicines not approved yet by the National Institute
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) [37] was opposed by patients
and pharmaceutical companies [38]. However, it was
announced later that the Cancer Drug Fund will become a
‘managed access’ fund for new cancer medicines which will
be given ‘conditional approval’ by NICE and provided for a
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defined period whilst further evidence from real world use
was collected [39].
As conditional approval or funding of medicines sub-
ject to the provision of satisfactory evidence is likely to
expand in the future, the potential societal and human
impact of withdrawal decisions has to be acknowledged
and prospectively managed by regulatory and funding
agencies. The public reaction to this case was perhaps
particularly strong as breast cancer has a high public profile
and bevacizumab had already achieved widespread use for
other cancers. Nonetheless, there is certainly room for im-
proving public understanding and acceptance of approval
or coverage schemes conditional to evidence development.
It will be contingent on regulators to develop and imple-
ment comprehensive risk management plans that include
the potentiality of withdrawal of the conditionally approved
indication. Insights from our analysis of the stakeholders’
responses to the FDA withdrawal allow us to examine the
factors that may have fuelled some of the more emotional
and acrimonious aspects of the debate and suggest a num-
ber of elements which may be incorporated in future risk
management strategies.
Conflicting interpretations of evidence
At the outset of this case, there were differences in inter-
pretations of the research evidence with regards to the
validity and clinical significance of the progression-free
survival endpoint and the relative weighting of potential
benefits and harms of bevacizumab. The purpose of regu-
latory decisions is to protect public health and to ensure
collective safety and this may conflict with what individual
patients want on some occasions. Some experts have
expressed concerns that ‘the plight of desperate patients
may divert attention from the value to present and future
patients and the society of ensuring the efficacy and safety
of new treatments’ [40]. Recently, the American Society of
Clinical Oncology aimed to reach a consensus on what
might constitute a “clinically meaningful outcome” target
for clinical trials of new cancer medicines, for example a
4.5 to 6 months improvement over current overall survival
for metastatic triple negative previously untreated meta-
static breast cancer [41]. However, some cancer survivors’
representatives have argued that ‘a month can be the
equivalent of a year if you have limited life expectancy’
[42], suggesting ongoing dialogue will be required and this
debate is not readily resolvable.
Patients’ beliefs about the effectiveness of bevacizumab
Other key issues that made management of the bevacizu-
mab withdrawal difficult for the FDA were the convictions
of breast cancer survivors that bevacizumab had “saved
their life” and the broadly optimistic background beliefs of
patients about the effectiveness of cancer treatments in
general and bevacizumab in particular.
The voices of patients who favoured bevacizumab were
certainly more widely and loudly heard than those of
patients who might not have favoured it. There are several
reasons for this. Survivors understandably often associate
their survival with the treatment they received, and are
often keen to speak up and support its continued availabil-
ity. Patients who do less well and do not survive (and who
were perhaps more likely to have experienced serious
harms) are obviously less able to testify. Concerns about
the lack or limited efficacy of bevacizumab in the majority
of patients, and about the significant proportion of pa-
tients who may experience serious harms, were mostly ab-
sent from the public debate.
The strong patient reaction may have also stemmed
from patients needing to maintain high expectations as a
coping strategy or not to be seen to be ‘giving up’ and
hastening death [43]. In this context, women with
advanced breast cancer may have perceived the FDA
withdrawal decision as taking away their only and last
hope of survival.
Patients often over-estimate the efficacy of cancer
treatments. A survey of US patients with advanced
(metastatic) colorectal and lung cancer found that a
large majority (69 % of patients with lung cancer and
81 % of those with colorectal cancer) did not understand
that chemotherapy would not cure their cancer [44].
Patients’ beliefs on the therapeutic value of cancer medi-
cines may be influenced by a complex range of clinical,
social and commercial forces. They may be shaped by
discussions with oncologists, which sometimes lead to
false optimism [45].
Beliefs in the therapeutic value of bevacizumab may
have been enhanced by its earlier approval in the manage-
ment of advanced colorectal cancer. Bevacizumab received
a lot of media attention when it was approved for this
indication and was called a ‘revolutionary’ medicine [46].
The rapid uptake of bevacizumab in the first year after
approval for colorectal cancer in the United States has
been described as unprecedented for a cancer medicine
[47]. People often incorrectly assumed that the benefits of
targeted cancer medicines which are observed for a spe-
cific cancer type can be confidently extrapolated to other
cancer types [48].
Approval of a medicine by the FDA, even if it is
provisional, is likely to bolster public opinion of a prod-
uct’s efficacy and safety. In a survey of about 3000 US
adults, 39 % reported beliefs that the FDA approves only
‘extremely effective drugs’ and 25 % reported beliefs that
the FDA approves ‘only drugs without serious adverse
effects’ [49].
Media reporting
High expectations about the value of new medicines are
often fuelled by enthusiastic media reports, particularly
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early in the product life cycle when stories are initiated
primarily by their commercial developers and associated
clinical advocates [50]. Lay media value novelty and tend
to emphasize clinical benefits rather than expressing
uncertainties or discussing the potential harms of cancer
medicines [51–53]. Information on the therapeutic value
of new medicines may get ‘streamlined’, removing com-
plexity and uncertainties [24]. Media reports may be
informed by sensational statements or press releases
issued by researchers, their institutions and the pharma-
ceutical industry which all stand to benefit in terms of
reputation and profits [54]. The study of newspaper
reports on bevacizumab and breast cancer [35] showed
that bevacizumab was presented very positively prior to
the FDA approval and this may have heartened percep-
tions among the public of the high therapeutic value of
this medicine.
Risk management planning, better communication and
resetting public expectations
Improving public understanding and acceptance of ap-
proval or coverage schemes conditional to evidence devel-
opment will require the concerted effort of different
stakeholders. Medical journals and research institutions
could try to present their findings on new medicines to
the media in a way that increases the probability of bal-
anced reporting by the mainstream media [54]. Specialised
training for health journalists might also be useful. In this
context, regulators such as the FDA have an important
role to play in developing and implementing communica-
tion strategies as part of risk management plans that
include contingency for future withdrawal of a condition-
ally approved indication.
Our analysis has identified a number of ways in which
regulators and associated agencies could work proactively
to promote the acceptability of justifiable withdrawals of
approval, and to limit the distress these may cause to
patients and the public.
Firstly, the difference in opinions between the initial
negative recommendation of ODAC and the FDA approval
decision could be seen, in hindsight, as an early warning
signal for potential problems if subsequent approval or
coverage needed to be reversed. Regulators could consider
that, where votes are split for approval, they need to
examine the reasons for the differences and consider using
these in communication activities with the public, health
professionals and the media. Risk management planning
at the time of the initial approval or coverage decision
may facilitate better understanding of the uncertainty of
the clinical place in practice of the approved medicine. A
number of documents were available on the FDA website,
both at the time of bevacizumab approval and withdrawal,
including full transcripts of hearings. However, the FDA
documents are lengthy and difficult to navigate, making
the information they contain difficult to access for lay
audiences and also for health professionals [55]. Moreover,
these documents may be challenging to find, which
restricts diffusion of their findings [56]. Regulators need to
ensure the information they provide is readily accessible
and to diverse audiences.
Secondly, over and above the need to provide improved
education of the public on the efficacy and safety of new
medicines [57], more realistic patient and provider expec-
tations need to be established, particularly where signifi-
cant uncertainties with regards to efficacy of the medical
technologies exist. It has been suggested that the FDA
could provide a summative statement or a rating for each
medicine approval to indicate the strength of clinical trial
evidence used to determine safety and efficacy, allowing
medicines approved on the basis of strong evidence to be
distinguished from those approved on the basis of less
strong evidence [58]. Medicines marketed under condi-
tional approval or funding may also need to be flagged in
some ways to alert or remind health professionals and
patients of the limited nature of the evidence and prelim-
inary nature of the approval– perhaps along the lines of
the black box warnings and black triangles that have been
developed to alert the public and providers to safety issues
or limitations in safety information.
Thirdly, in some countries patient consent to continuing
therapy based on achieving health improvements is a
requirement of subsidisation. Similar strategies may be
appropriate for conditional coverage schemes, where
patients might be asked to acknowledge, when starting
therapy, that there is still uncertainty about effectiveness or
safety and to agree that continuing therapy may be
dependent on subsequent evidence of efficacy or safety.
Furthermore, it has been argued that it would be reasonable
to require patients who access medical interventions of
uncertain benefit to contribute data to ongoing evaluation
[59]. Such schemes are currently developing as part of
coverage with evidence development funding programs [2].
Finally, the potential for the media to promote unreal-
istic expectations of medicines highlights the need for an
ongoing media communications strategy as part of the
implementation of coverage with evidence develop-
ment or provisional approval programs, particularly
those that may be implemented over long time frames.
In 2009, the FDA adopted a strategic plan for risk com-
munication [60] and in 2010, the FDA Transparency
Task Force published recommendations for making
information about FDA activities and decision-making
more readily available to the public in a timely manner
and in a user-friendly format. However, this does not
yet include risk management plans concerning condi-
tional regulatory approvals. A targeted communication
plan may include information on what regulatory and
funding agencies know and do not know about new
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medicines that are marketed or funded. It may involve
ongoing press releases and media briefings from regu-
lators or insurers as part of a sustained communication
strategy while awaiting evidence development. This
plan may need to be adapted depending on the extent
of product use.
Although it remains to be shown how these strategies
may be applied in the setting of conditional approval or
funding of medicines, some measures have already been
implemented in practice. In 2011, the European Medicines
introduced a new scheme, which imposed the use of an
inverted black triangle symbol to improve public aware-
ness of medicines subject to additional safety monitoring
[61]. This scheme also applies to medicines granted condi-
tional approval where the company is required to under-
take additional safety studies [61]. In March 2015, the
Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
recommended that the revised Framework for the Man-
aged Access Programme (MAP), where some medicines
can be funded pending submission of more conclusive
evidence of cost-effectiveness, should include ‘a communi-
cation strategy, targeted at patients and prescribers, that
clearly articulates the arrangement is central to any new or
continued MAP (including the possibility that a drug may
not be reimbursed indefinitely’ [62]. It also recommended
that ‘patients who are prescribed a medicine listed as part
of a MAP must understand the process and provide
informed consent’ [62].
Conclusion
The withdrawal of conditional approval or conditional
funding of new medicines due to uncertain efficacy may
not be well accepted by the public for a number of reasons
including the complexity of the scientific evaluation of
new medicines and the development of unrealistic hopes
fuelled by news media and the pharmaceutical industry.
We have proposed strategies that may be considered by
regulatory and funding agencies in the development of
risk management plans in the future. They involve tar-
geted, comprehensible and ongoing communication with
the public and the media, specific labelling or marking of
the medicines, and possibly formal patient acknowledge-
ment of the nature and the risks of conditional approval.
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